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*1001 $aPersson, Torsten$0(NO-TrBIB)90202849$_31807600
*24510$aHow do electoral rules shape party structures, government coalitions, and economic policies?$cTorsten Persson, Gérard Roland, Guido Tabellini
*260  $aCambridge, Mass.$bNational Bureau of Economic Research$c2003
*300  $a60 s.$btab.
*4901 $aWorking paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research$v10176
*7001 $aRoland, Gerard$0(NO-TrBIB)90941682$_17393700
*7001 $aTabellini, Guido$0(NO-TrBIB)98004495$_36095300
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