When risky decisions are not surprising : an application of prospect theory to the Israeli war decision in 2006
Anat Niv-Solomon Artikkel Engelsk
*0011259629 *008170609s2016 xx# 000 0 eng *019 $bk *08230$a956.920452 *100 $aNiv-Solomon, Anat$4aut$_147893600 *245 $aWhen risky decisions are not surprising$ban application of prospect theory to the Israeli war decision in 2006 *300 $aS. [484]-503 *500 $aVitenskapelig artikkel *650 $aLibanon-krigen (2006)$9nor$2norart$_147893700 *651 $aIsrael$_11185600 *651 $aLibanon$_17234100 *653 $aHezbollah$9eng$_147893800 *653 $aIsrael$9eng$_140718900 *653 $aSecond Lebanon War$9eng$_147893900 *653 $adecision-making$9eng$_131108600 *653 $aprospect theory$9eng$_147894000 *773 $tCooperation and conflict$gVol. 51, no. 4 (2016)$x0010-8367$w(NO-LaBS)586269(tnr) *8564 $uhttps://doi.org/10.1177/0010836716640837 *999 $z1700613353$anorart:1700613353 ^